The ties that bind: Principles of cohesion in cohabitation and marriage

A vast literature addresses the correlates of marital stability, but little is known about what unites cohabiting partners over time. Although a speci alized division of labor might increase the benefits of marriage and streng then ties between husband and wife, transactional considerations make speci alization unattractive for cohabiters. Drawing from work on the emergence o f commitment, we argue that cohabiters are more likely to remain together u nder conditions of equality Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynam ics, we test these ideas by modeling the stability of married and longterm cohabiting unions in the United Stares. We find that married couples who ad opt a more specialized division of labor are less likely to divorce, but th e effect is modest. Among cohabiters, partners whew employment and earnings are increasingly similar face sharply reduced risks of breaking up, but th e effect is asymmetric: Inequality is more disruptive when the female cohab iter earns more than her partner.