Ja. Brickley et al., What happens to CEOs after they retire? New evidence on career concerns, horizon problems, and CEO incentives, J FINAN EC, 52(3), 1999, pp. 341-377
This paper provides evidence on a previously unidentified source of manager
ial incentives: concerns about post-retirement board service. Both the like
lihood that a retired CEO serves on his own board two years after departure
, as well as the likelihood of serving as an outside director on other boar
ds, are positively and strongly related to his performance while CEO. Reten
tion on the CEO's own board depends primarily on stock returns, while servi
ce on outside boards is better explained by accounting returns. The evidenc
e also suggests that firms consider ability in choosing board members. (C)
1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.