Consciousness and the state/transitive/creature distinction

This essay examines the grammatical structure underlying the use of the wor d "conscious". Despite the existence of this grammatical structure, I rejec t the assumption that actual consciousness has a similar structure. Specifi cally, I reject the claim that consciousness consists of three subtypes: st ate consciousness, transitive consciousness, and creature consciousness. I offer an inductive argument and a deductive argument that no such psycholog ical entities exist. The inductive argument: given the lack of evidence or arguments for the entities and given that a tripartite consciousness struct ure evolved from a tripartite grammatical habit, it would be far tao coinci dental if the grammatical distinction mirrored a psychological distinction. The deductive argument (a reductio ad absurdum) shows that absurd conclusi ons follow from assuming the existence of three distinct psychological enti ties. Furthermore, the verbal habits that motivate the distinction are rend ered more intelligible under a "Unitary Thesis': the idea that verbal disti nctions involving use of the word "conscious" are unified in their reliance on a single ontological unit, that of conscious experience.