Policy divergence in multicandidate probabilistic spatial voting

Existing models of multicandidate spatial competition with probabilistic vo ting typically predict a high degree of policy convergence, yet in actual e lections candidates advocate quite divergent sets of policies. What account s for this disparity between theory and empirical observation? I introduce two variations on the basic probabilistic vote model which may account for candidate policy divergence: 1) a model which incorporates candidate-specif ic variables, so that candidates may enjoy nonpolicy-related electoral adva ntages (or disadvantages); 2) a model which allows nonzero correlations bet ween the random terms associated with voters' candidate utilities, thereby capturing situations where voters view two or more candidates as similar on nonpolicy grounds. I report candidate equilibrium analyses for each model, which show far greater policy divergence than exists under the standard pr obabilistic vote model. I then analyze the strategic logic which underlies these results.