THE SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF SUBJECTIVE CONCEPTS IN MODELS OF ANIMAL-WELFARE

This paper takes a closer look at the subjectivity/objectivity relatio nship, as it plays a role in the science of animal welfare. It argues that subjective, experiential states in animals such as well-being and suffering are, contrary to what is often assumed, open to empirical o bservation and scientific assessment. The presumably purely private, i naccessible nature of such states is not an inherent property of these states, but derives from their misguided conception as 'causal object s' in mechanistic models of behaviour. This inevitably endows subjecti ve experience with a 'hidden' status. However, subjective experience s hould be approached on its own conceptual grounds, i.e. as a perspecti ve, in terms of 'what-it-is-like-to-be' a particular individual animal . Neither behaviour nor subjective experience then can be regarded as causal objects; they form an integrated, dynamic, expressive whole. Th e animal is perceived as an agent, whose perspective on a given situat ion is manifest in the way in which it interacts with and pays attenti on to that situation. In this framework, concepts of subjective experi ence such as enthusiasm, timidity, fear or contentedness, may be defin ed as categories of 'attentional style'. Testing the scientific validi ty and reliability of such categories requires development of a qualit ative methodology for the measurement of behaviour. Starting-points fo r such a method are put forward for discussion. (C) 1997 Elsevier Scie nce B.V.