Symmetry-breaking bifurcations and representative firm in dynamic duopoly games

Authors
Bischi, GI Gallegati, M Naimzada, A
Citation
Gi. Bischi et al., Symmetry-breaking bifurcations and representative firm in dynamic duopoly games, ANN OPER R, 89, 1999, pp. 253-272
Citations number
33
Categorie Soggetti
Engineering Mathematics
Journal title
ANNALS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
ISSN journal
02545330 → ACNP
Volume
89
Year of publication
1999
Pages
253 - 272
Database
ISI
SICI code
0254-5330(1999)89:<253:SBARFI>2.0.ZU;2-#
Abstract
A new framework for equilibrium selection is presented. Playing games recur rently in space and time may render one of the equilibria "spatially domina nt". Prevailing initially on a large enough finite part of the space, it wi ll take over on the whole space in the long run. In particular it will driv e out the other equilibria along travelling waves. This new dominance conce pt is compared with the Harsanyi-Selten risk-dominance concept.