On biodiversity access, intellectual property rights, and conservation

Recent international agreements such as the Convention on Biological Divers ity and the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights have called for incr eased mutual transfer of biodiversity and biotechnology between poor and ri ch countries. These agreements also call for the protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) on biotechnology transferors in the receiving countr ies. This paper examines the biodiversity conservation implications of prov iding physical access and IPR protection to foreign consumers of biodiversi ty. An integrated model of optimal resource extinction and shared resource harvesting game is presented. The model results show that, as foreign and i ndigenous users compete for the same open-access resource, optimal extincti on may occur as a noncooperative equilibrium under certain bioeconomic cond itions. Extinction may be prevented by forging successful cooperation betwe en consumers, initiating a joint harvesting process. Depending upon the mod el parameters, even under cooperation, increased patent protection and phys ical access either promotes the conservation of biodiversity or enhances it s physical exploitation. Patent protection and resource access must, theref ore, be developed carefully by biodiversity-rich countries to successfully balance their domestic conservation and socioeconomic goals. (C) 1999 Elsev ier Science B.V. All rights reserved.