There are many calls for a definitions personhood, but also many logical an
d Wittgensteinian reasons to think fulfilling this is unimportant or imposs
ible. I argue that we can consider many contexts as language-games and cons
ider the person as the key player in each. We can then examine the attribut
es, presuppositions and implications of personhood in those contexts. I use
law and therapeutic psychology as two examples of such contexts or languag
e-games. Each correlates with one of the classic "theories'' of ethics-deon
tology and consequentialism. But each is a large enough cluster to consider
them as paradigms in a sense related to Thomas Kuhn's notion in The Struct
ure of Scientific Revolutions. Showing the presuppositions about and "takes
'' on personhood together with the connections involved in the paradigms de
epens the dilemmas we already know to be present.