This article argues against the conventional wisdom of taking the alleged s
uccess of cold war deterrence as a viable model for South Asia. It notes th
at we are only beginning to fully understand the costs of the cold war, cos
ts that are incommensurate with a logic that argues that since a nuclear ex
change did not take place between the United States and the former Soviet U
nion, it provides a credible model for India and Pakistan to follow: The ar
ticle argues that domestic populations of nuclear,weapons states are the pr
incipal victims of nuclearization due to the risks built into the constitut
ion of expensive technologically sophisticated megaprojects and makes the c
ase for why international pressures against proliferation must be replaced
by domestic groups acting in concert internationally. In short, domestic le
gal and moral constraints are the most appropriate means of controlling the
inherently anti-democratic and militarist tendencies of the nuclear comple
x.