This article analyses why India's signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Tre
aty (CTBT) and its "capitulation" to the Unequal Global Nuclear Bargain (UG
NB) cannot be the may out of a volatile and dangerous mess. The author's an
alysis is meant to show why a nuclear policy that has turned hawkish and la
nded itself in deep trouble cannot bail itself out, or be allowed to do so,
by sacrificing well-established principles and swinging to the other extre
me, foreclosing its independence. The author argues that the real issue is,
weaponization. India's national policy must be made to commit itself, first
, to non-deployment of the nuclear warheads it has on hand, then to pledge
non-weaponization of fissile material stocks, and finally-as soon as feasib
le and in tandem or cooperation with Pakistan-to the dismantling of the nuc
lear weapons in its small armory.