Domestic politics, absolute deprivation, and the use of armed force in interstate territorial disputes, 1950-1990

Evidence suggests that a territorial dispute is almost a necessary conditio n for interstate war. By applying the diversionary theory of a relationship between domestic dissatisfaction and states' external aggression, the auth or examines the circumstances that push challenger states to use armed forc e in such disputes. This theory is refined by incorporating variables measu ring risk and costs. The author contends that regime leaders are risk and c ost averse, not risk and cost willing, as widely alleged. This applies in p articular to democratically elected leaders. A new measure of dissatisfacti on that draws on deprivation theory is provided. Using probit regression, a n analysis covering 1950 to 1990 confirms most of the predictions but with two conspicuous exceptions: democracies are not more prone to use diversion than nondemocracies, and democracies show a disregard for the economic cos ts of armed diversion.