Ideology, autonomy, and institutional aura. Political sociology of centralbanks

Authors
Citation
R. Weinert, Ideology, autonomy, and institutional aura. Political sociology of centralbanks, KOLNER Z SO, 51(2), 1999, pp. 339
Citations number
103
Categorie Soggetti
Psycology
Journal title
KOLNER ZEITSCHRIFT FUR SOZIOLOGIE UND SOZIALPSYCHOLOGIE
ISSN journal
00232653 → ACNP
Volume
51
Issue
2
Year of publication
1999
Database
ISI
SICI code
0023-2653(199906)51:2<339:IAAIAP>2.0.ZU;2-2
Abstract
Based on recent research in the field of sociology of political institution s an approach on central banks as intermediary regulative institutions is d eveloped. Central banks have to meet an instrumental and expressive functio n, which is shaped as ideology and institutional aura. Presupposed is a hig h degree of political autonomy. The following basic elements of the institu tional politics of central banks are discussed: credibility, societal coali tions, guaranteed neutrality of experts, discrete political action, and the conservative central banker. The differentiation of monetary stability in highly developed monetary economies is stark, however the variation of poli tical autonomy is pronounced. From a sociological perspective, the politics of central banks cannot be reduced to the dimension of political autonomy, the elements of institutional politics mentioned above must be incorporate d into the analysis.