Fg. Mixon et Jb. Wilkinson, Compensation schemes and human capital attainment in congress: Is there anadverse selection of legislator attributes?, PUBL FIN R, 27(4), 1999, pp. 418-433
This study examines the role that compensation plays in the self-selection
process of legislator attributes in the U.S. Congress. The statistical resu
lts from the 104th Congress suggest that human capital levels of senators a
re significantly different from those of representatives, and this result i
s likely duc to adverse selection because of the disparity in compensation
schemes across the two chambers of the Congress. Such a result has potentia
lly significant consequences given the constitutional provisions that place
taxation authority in the U.S. House of Representatives, and the fact that
House members sponsor vastly larger amounts of spending legislation land t
otal legislation) than senators. Although much future work is needed to be
done, this study lays a foundation for public choice scholars to ponder.