Vm. Sanchez, Taking a byte out of minimum contacts: A reasonable exercise of personal jurisdiction in cyberspace trademark disputes, UCLA LAW R, 46(5), 1999, pp. 1671-1717
The development of technology strains the boundaries of legal doctrines and
precedent. It raises new problems and concerns and forces courts to modify
or revise existing law. One of the newest and fastest-growing areas of tec
hnological development is the Internet, in particular the World Wide Web. M
any businesses have taken advantage of the astonishingly rapid growth of th
e Internet by setting up web sites through which they can sell their servic
es or products to a largely unlimited audience. The growth of business on t
he Internet has thus created a race for the use of companies' trademarks as
web-site domain names. Because the owners of registered trademarks are nos
assured the exclusive use of their trademarks as domain names, trademark d
isputes regarding web sites are at an all-time high.
The most difficult issue raised in these trademark disputes is the assertio
n of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants whose primary contac
ts with the forum state consist of online interaction. While the doctrine o
f personal jurisdiction is territorially based, the Internet cuts across te
rritorial boundaries and allows unlimited access to anyone, anywhere in the
world. Courts are being called on to determine whether defendants' Interne
t contacts satisfy the due process requirements of minimum contacts. Curren
t case law reveals that courts are struggling to find suitable analogies fo
r the Internet and are reaching inconsistent outcomes.
In this Comment, Veronica Sanchez discusses the novel issues raised by the
Internet for the assertion of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defend
ants conducting activities on the web. Sanchez then analyzes the goals of p
ersonal jurisdiction doctrine and proposes a framework for analyzing Intern
et contacts to ensure that the goals of the doctrine are met. In her discus
sion, Sanchez concludes that courts are not applying both prongs of the due
process test and that the degree of technological sophistication of a cour
t impacts its assertion of personal jurisdiction.