Double contingency and reflexive anthropology

Basically, sociology is grounded on two anthropological assumptions, which can be understood as the answers to the following two questions: "Who is a human being?" and "What is a human being?" The answer to the second questio n leads to a definition of the nature of human beings which can only be giv en in the framework of concrete social processes. This assumption is an ant hropological one insofar as the undefined character of the relation of livi ng beings to the environment is only ascribed to humans. The answer to the question as to who is a human being however, is generally presumed to be al ready known. This article suggests treating this question just like the que stion of the nature of human beings. The term "human being," therefore, is not understood in the sense of a "species being," but as a code for "being a person" or in other words, as a code for the social conceived as "double contingency." The answer to the question of who is to be treated as a "huma n being" in this sense can then also be understood as changing throughout h istory. Central for an argument along these lines is a reinterpretation of Plessner's theory of "eccentric positionality," stating that with Plessner, anthropology's aim of defining what makes humans different from other spec ies takes a reflexive turn. In this way anthropology is seen as only one po ssible way of closing the circle of individuals who exist socially The answ er to the question of who is a social actor/social person is not predetermi ned, but rather has to be reconstructed empirically.