Heuristics and biases: Selected errors in clinical reasoning

Authors
Citation
As. Elstein, Heuristics and biases: Selected errors in clinical reasoning, ACAD MED, 74(7), 1999, pp. 791-794
Citations number
17
Categorie Soggetti
General & Internal Medicine
Journal title
ACADEMIC MEDICINE
ISSN journal
10402446 → ACNP
Volume
74
Issue
7
Year of publication
1999
Pages
791 - 794
Database
ISI
SICI code
1040-2446(199907)74:7<791:HABSEI>2.0.ZU;2-3
Abstract
Many clinical decisions are made in uncertainty. When the diagnosis is unce rtain, the goal is to establish a diagnosis or to treat even if the diagnos is remains unknown. If the diagnosis is known (e.g., breast cancer or prost ate cancer) but the treatment is risky and its outcome uncertain, still a c hoice must be made. In researching the psychology of clinical judgment and decision making, the major strategy is to compare observed clinical judgmen ts and decisions with the normative model established by statistical :decis ion theory. In this framework, the process of diagnosing is conceptualized as using imperfect information to revise opinions; Bayes' theorem is the fo rmal rule:for updating a diagnosis as new data are available. Treatment;dec isions should be made so as:to maximize expected value. This essay uses Bay es' theorem and concepts from decision theory to describe and explain some well-documented errors in clinical reasoning. Heuristics and biases are the cognitive factors-that produce these errors.