Regulating corporate criminal sanctions: Federal guidelines and the sentencing of public firms

Federal Sentencing Guidelines Governing Organizations purport to constrain judicial discretion over corporate criminal penalties. We investigate the e ffect on courts' sentencing decisions using pre- and post-Guidelines data, including evidence on cases and penalties that the Guidelines do not comple tely control. We find that fines and total penalties are higher than they w ere previously. Evidence that fines increased more in Guidelines-constraine d cases than elsewhere suggests the effort to constrain judicial discretion has had a direct effect. Evidence of higher total penalties, even in cases not directly constrained by the Guidelines, suggests that judges may have cooperated with the policy of imposing higher fines and total sanctions, al though not to the extent that the Guidelines prescribe. Our findings are in consistent with the basic attitudinal model from the political science lite rature, We explore other forces that may be at work.