Bimatrix games have quasi-strict equilibria

Authors
Citation
H. Norde, Bimatrix games have quasi-strict equilibria, MATH PROGR, 85(1), 1999, pp. 35-49
Citations number
12
Categorie Soggetti
Mathematics
Journal title
MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING
ISSN journal
00255610 → ACNP
Volume
85
Issue
1
Year of publication
1999
Pages
35 - 49
Database
ISI
SICI code
0025-5610(199905)85:1<35:BGHQE>2.0.ZU;2-N
Abstract
In this paper we show that every bimatrix game has at least one quasi-stric t equilibrium, i.e. a Nash-equilibrium with the property that every player assigns positive probability to each of his pure best replies.