What's in a cause?: The pragmatic dimensions of genetic explanations

The paper argues for a pragmatic account of genetic explanation. This is to say that when a disease or other trait is termed 'genetic,' the reasons fo r singling out genes as causes over other, also necessary, genetic and nong enetic conditions are not wholly theoretical but include pragmatic dimensio ns. Whether the explanation is the presence of a trait in an individual or differences in a trait among individuals, genetic explanations are context- dependent in three ways: they are relative to a causal background of geneti c and nongenetic factors; they are relative to a population; and they are r elative to the present state of knowledge. Criteria like causal priority, n onstandardness, and causal efficacy that purport to distinguish objectively between genetic causes and nongenetic conditions either incorporate pragma tic elements or fail for other reasons. When the pragmatic dimensions of ge netic explanations are recognized, we come to understand the current phenom enon of "geneticization'' to be a reflection of increased technological cap acities to manipulate genes in the laboratory, and potentially the clinic, rather than theoretical progress in understanding how diseases and other tr aits arise. This calls into question the value of the search for theoretica l definitions of designations like 'genetic disease' or 'genetic susceptibi lity' as directives for action.