Implementation issues: the political economy of efficient fishing

Responses to over-fishing are very similar. Efforts begin with gear restric tions, area closures and seasonal closures. Entry restrictions, including a license moratorium and a license buyback program, often follow. The result s are similar too. Over-fishing and effort increases continue. Common prope rty (not open access) regimes (community development quotas-CDQs), private property regimes (individual transferable quotas-ITQs) and Pigouvian taxes can produce the optimal amount at the minimum cost. Of course, the details of each are critical. Political feasibility issues and local conditions are factored into the CDQ-ITQ-tax decision and the resolution of the key detai ls of each. Fisher heterogeneity and possible ways to reduce it are especia lly important issues. Since over-fishing problems, initial government respo nses and results are so common, the policy formulation process and recommen ded outcome have potential global relevance. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.