Et. Loehman et To. Randhir, Alleviating soil erosion/pollution stock externalities: alternative roles for government, ECOL ECON, 30(1), 1999, pp. 29-46
This paper addresses two temporal externalities due to agriculture: soil er
osion and related pollution. The possibility of decentralization of decisio
ns, the appropriate role of a resource manager, and the efficiency of alter
native policies are examined using traditional welfare economics concepts f
or a two-sector model of rural-urban linkage. Three alternative types of po
licies can be socially efficient, but imply different involvement by govern
ment, and have different knowledge requirements. A Pigouvian policy require
s full information. A bargaining solution involves government only in setti
ng an entitlement, but it may require too much knowledge by rural household
s in terms of understanding dynamic environmental relationships. A third wa
y is that government and rural households be co-producers of environmental
goods. This concept assigns government the responsibility for maintaining k
nowledge about environmental relationships, and government is a participant
in a market system that determines prices for environmental-related goods.
(C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.