Attention versus consciousness in the visual brain: Differences in conception, phenomenology, behavior, neuroanatomy, and physiology

Authors
Citation
Bj. Baars, Attention versus consciousness in the visual brain: Differences in conception, phenomenology, behavior, neuroanatomy, and physiology, J GEN PSYCH, 126(3), 1999, pp. 224-233
Citations number
34
Categorie Soggetti
Psycology
Journal title
JOURNAL OF GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY
ISSN journal
00221309 → ACNP
Volume
126
Issue
3
Year of publication
1999
Pages
224 - 233
Database
ISI
SICI code
0022-1309(199907)126:3<224:AVCITV>2.0.ZU;2-I
Abstract
A common confound between consciousness and attention makes it difficult to think clearly about recent advances in the understanding of the visual bra in. Visual consciousness involves phenomenal experience of the visual world , but visual attention is more plausibly treated as a function that selects and maintains the selection of potential conscious contents, often unconsc iously. In the same sense, eye movements select conscious visual events, wh ich are not the same as conscious visual experience. According to common se nse, visual experience is consciousness, and selective processes are labele d as attention. The distinction is reflected in very different behavioral m easures and in very different brain anatomy and physiology. Visual consciou sness tends to be associated with the "what" stream of visual feature neuro ns in the ventral temporal lobe. In contrast, attentional selection and mai ntenance are mediated by other brain regions, ranging from superior collicu li to thalamus, prefrontal cortex, and anterior cingulate. The author appli ed the common-sense distinction between attention and consciousness to the theoretical positions of M. I. Posner (1992, 1994) and D. LaBerge (1997, 19 98) to show how it helps to clarify the evidence. He concluded that clarity of thought is served by calling a thing by its proper name.