Bourdieu and the logic of practice: Is all giving Indian-giving or is "generalized materialism" not enough?

I argue here that in the end Bourdieu's theory of practice Sails to overcom e the problem on which it expressly centers, namely, subject-object dualism . The failure is registered in his avowed materialism, which, though signif icantly "generalized," remains what it says: a materialism In order to subs tantiate my criticism, I examine for their ontological presuppositions thre e areas of his theoretical framework pertaining to the questions of(I) huma n agency las seen through the conceptual glass of the habitus), (2) otherne ss, and (3) the gift. By scrutinizing Bourdieu's powerful and progressive s ocial theory, with an eye to finding fault, I hope to show the need to take a certain theoretical action, one that is patently out of keeping with the usual self-presentation and self understanding of social science. The acti on I have in mind is this: because the problem of subject-object dualism is in the first place a matter of ontology, in order successfully to address it there must take place a direct shift of ontological starting point, from the received starting point in Western thought to one that projects realit y in terms of ambiguity that is basic. With this shift the dualism of subje ct and object dissolves by definition, leaving a social reality that, for r easons of its basic ambiguity, is best approached as a question of ethics b efore power.