An internal reconstruction and an immanent critique of Bourdieu's generativ
e structuralism is presented. Rather than starting with the concept of "hab
itus," as is usually done, the article tries to systematically reconstruct
Bourdieu's theory by an analysis of the relational logic that permeates his
whole work. Tracing the debt Bourdieu's approach owes to Bachelard's ratio
nalism and Cassirer's relationalism, the article examines Bourdieu's episte
mological writings of the 1960s and 70s. It tries to make the case that Bou
rdieu's sociological metascience represents a rationalist version of Bhaska
r's critical realism, and enjoins Bourdieu to give heed to the realist turn
in the philosophy of the natural and the social sciences. The article show
s how Bourdieu's epistemological assumptions are reflected in his primary t
heoretical constructs of "habitus " and "field." To concretize their discus
sion, it analyzes Bourdieu's reinterpretation of Weber in his theory of the
field of religion and of the young Mannheim in his theory of the scientifi
c field.