Anchoring is a pervasive judgment bias in which decision makers are systema
tically influenced by random and uninformative starting points. While ancho
rs have been shown to affect a broad range of judgments including answers t
o knowledge questions, monetary evaluations, and social judgments, the unde
rlying causes of anchoring have been explored only recently. We suggest tha
t anchors affect judgments by increasing the availability and construction
of features that the anchor and target hold in common and reducing the avai
lability of features of the target that differ from the anchor. We test thi
s notion of anchoring as activation in five experiments that examine the ef
fects of several experimental manipulations on judgments of value and belie
f as well as on measures of cognitive processes. Our results indicate that
prompting subjects to consider features of the item that are different from
the anchor reduces anchoring, while increasing consideration of similar fe
atures has no effect. The anchoring-as-activation approach provides a mecha
nism for debiasing anchoring and also points to a common mechanism underlyi
ng anchoring and a number of other judgment phenomena. (C) 1999 Academic Pr
ess.