This study developed and tested the idea that social categorization process
es help to explain framing effects in social dilemmas, Using self-categoriz
ation theory, we predicted that members of a collective would cooperate mor
e when they faced homogeneous rather than heterogeneous resource frames, We
manipulated the starting point of resources for the members of each of two
subgroups making up a larger collective in a nested social dilemma. The re
sources of the subject's own subgroup started at the individual, subgroup,
or collective level, and the resources of the opposing subgroup also starte
d at the individual, subgroup, or collective level, The condition in which
both subgroups' resources began at the collective level was similar to a tr
aditional commons dilemma, while the condition in which both subgroups' res
ources began at the individual level was similar to a traditional public go
ods problem, The other conditions were new to this research domain. We foun
d higher allocations to the collective account when the initial resource lo
cation was the same for both subgroups (versus different for each subgroup)
, even when this initial location was the subgroup or individual level. Whe
reas previous explanations for framing effects cannot account for these res
ults, social categorization processes provide a parsimonious explanation fo
r the observed pattern of allocations. (C) 1999 Academic Press.