Competition between individuals and groups: Do incentives matter? A group adaptiveness perspective

In their research on individual-group discontinuity using prisoner's Dilemm a Game (PDG), Schopler; Insko, and associates observed that groups were mor e competitive than individuals. Alternatively, we propose that this effect can be interpreted as a group-adaptiveness phenomenon. In a 2 (individuals vs. groups) x 2 (low vs. high incentives to cooperate) PDG study individual s groups played against a cooperative opponent. Individual-group discontinu ity was found when incentives to cooperate were low, but not when incentive s were high. Results further suggest that the stronger intergroup competiti on observed in past discontinuity research may have been triggered and perp etuated by between-group violations of cooperative proposals. These finding s are consistent with our group adaptiveness perspective, which proposes th at groups are not invariably more competitive than individuals, but that th ey are more likely to adapt their behaviors to variations in the task and/o r social environment in an attempt to attain important group goats.