Bourdieu, Smith and disinterested judgement

The paper presents a sympathetic critique of Bourdieu's work in terms of th e tension between its critical intentions and its leanings towards sociolog ical reductionism. Although Bourdieu argues against such reductionism in hi s methodological pronouncements, his empirical studies tend to reduce actor s' putative disinterested judgements to functions of their habitus in relat ion to the social field and to unconscious strategies of distinction. Furth er, his concept of (non-monetary) forms of capital occludes the difference between use-value and exchange-value and the corresponding distinction betw een the pursuit of goods and the pursuit of distinction, which are vital fo r both explanation and critique. Moreover his suspicion of normative judgem ent on the part of social science and his concealment of his own normative standpoint subvert his critiques. Thus in relation to Bourdieu's analysis o f the role of mis-recognition in social life I argue that this requires a d elineation of the extent of justified recognition. In developing the argume nt I draw upon Adam Smith's analysis of moral sentiments and his critique o f undeserved recognition and the pursuit of distinction. Where Bourdieu is dismissive about moral issues, Smith treats moral sentiments as irreducible to interest or instrumental action and as a significant element in the rep roduction of social order. The paper concludes with some implications for t he nature of critique in social theory.