We use data from the Leadership Opinion Project (LOP), a panel survey of Am
erican opinion leaders which brackets the end of the Cold War, to investiga
te two interrelated questions about the structure of elites' foreign policy
beliefs. We assess, first, whether the militant internationalism/cooperati
ve internationalism scheme, developed primarily by Wittkopf (1981, 1990) an
d Holsti and Rosenau (1990), has continued relevance now that the USSR has
collapsed; and second, whether Hurwitz and Peffley's (1987, 1990; see also
Peffley and Hurwitz, 1992; Hurwitz, Peffley, and Seligson, 1993) domain-spe
cific, hierarchical model of mass belief structure can be applied to elite
belief systems. The evidence indicates that respondents' past stances towar
d military and cooperative ventures are highly predictive of their views on
ce the Cold War ends. This continuity in leaders' postures toward internati
onal affairs, in itself, suggests that "enemy images" of the Soviet Union w
ere less important within elite belief systems than Hurwitz and Peffley (19
90; see also Peffley and Hurwitz, 1992) posited for the mass public. The st
arkest difference, however, between their findings for mass samples and our
findings for a leadership sample centers on the importance of ideology in
constraining foreign policy beliefs, and the close interconnection with dom
estic beliefs. Consequently, as we illustrate, predictable ideological divi
sions among opinion leaders persist in the post-Cold War era. In sum, our e
vidence demonstrates considerable continuity in elites' beliefs despite pro
found changes in the global system, and reaffirms the importance that ideol
ogy plays in structuring attitudes within elite belief systems.