This article considers both structural and strategic influences on collecti
ve action. Each person in a group wants to participate only if the total nu
mber taking part is at least her threshold; people use a network to communi
cate their thresholds. People are strategically rational in that they are c
ompletely rational and also take into account that others are completely ra
tional. The model shows first that network position is much more important
in influencing the revolt of people with low thresholds than people with hi
gh thresholds. Second, it shows that strong links are better for revolt; wh
en thresholds are low, and weak links are better when thresholds are high.
Finally, the model generalizes the threshold models of Schelling (1978) and
Granovetter (1978) and shows that their findings that revolt is very sensi
tive to the thresholds of people "early" in the process depends heavily on
the assumption that communication is never reciprocal.