Party systems and electoral volatility in Latin America: A test of economic, institutional, and structural explanations

Three different theoretical explanations are tested for the exceptionally h igh level of electoral volatility I found in contemporary Latin America: ec onomic voting, institutional characteristics of political, regimes and part y systems, and the structure and organization of class cleavages. A pooled cross-sectional time-series regression analysis is conducted on 58 congress ional elections and 43 presidential elections in 16 Latin American countrie s during the 1980s and 1990s. institutional variables have the most consist ent effect on volatility while the influence of economic performance is hea vily contingent upon the type of election and whether the dependent variabl e is operationalized as incumbent vote change or aggregate electoral volati lity. The results demonstrate that electoral volatility is a function of sh ort-term economic perturbations, the institutional fragilities of both demo cratic regimes and party systems, and relatively fluid cleavage structures.