Binding and the phenomenal unity of consciousness

The binding problem is frequently discussed in consciousness research. Howe ver, it is by no means clear what the problem is supposed to be and how exa ctly it relates to consciousness. In the present paper the nature of the bi nding problem is clarified by distinguishing between different formulations of the problem. Some of them make no mention of consciousness, whereas oth ers are directly related to aspects of phenomenal experience. Certain formu lations of the binding problem are closely connected to the classical philo sophical problem of the unity of consciousness and the currently fashionabl e search for the neural correlates of consciousness. Nonetheless, only a pa rt of the current empirical research on binding is directly relevant to the study of consciousness. The main message of the present paper is that the science of consciousness needs to establish a clear theoretical view of the relation between binding and consciousness and to encourage further empiri cal work that builds on such a theoretical foundation, (C) 1999 Academic Pr ess.