Agents interacting with an incompletely known world need to be able to reas
on about the effects of their actions, and to gain further information abou
t that world they need to use sensors of some sea. Unfortunately, both the
effects of actions and the information returned from sensors are subject to
error. To cope with such uncertainties, the agent can maintain probabilist
ic beliefs about the state of the world. With probabilistic beliefs the age
nt will be able to quantify the likelihood of the various outcomes of its a
ctions and is better able to utilize the information gathered from its erro
r-prone actions and sensors. In this paper, we present a model in which we
can reason about an agent's probabilistic degrees of belief and the manner
in which these beliefs change as various actions are executed. We build on
a general logical theory of action developed by Reiter and others, formaliz
ed in the situation calculus. We propose a simple axiomatization that captu
res an agent's state of belief and the manner in which these beliefs change
when actions are executed. Our model displays a number of intuitively reas
onable properties. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.