'If pigs could fly': A test of counterfactual reasoning and pretence in children with autism

The authors report an experiment with children with autism, using the Dias & Harris (1990) method, to test the predictions that: (i) children with aut ism will show intact count counterfactual reasoning, and (ii) since such ch ildren are impaired in pretence, they would not then show the normal facili tation effect of pretence on counterfactual reasoning ability. Children wit h autism and matched verbal mental age (VMA) controls were presented with a series of counterfactual syllogisms, in two conditions. One condition (Cou nterfactual plus Pretence) involved prompting the child's imagination durin g the reasoning task, whereas the other condition (Counterfactual Only) inc luded no such prompting. Results showed chat both normal 4-5-year-old child ren, and children with moderate learning difficulties improved in their rea soning performance when prompted to use imagination. This replicates and ex tends findings from Dias & Harris (1990). In children with autism, however, performance was good in the Counterfactual Only condition, but became wors e when imagination was prompted. These results show that although abstract counterfactual reasoning appears intact in children with autism, their coun terfactual reasoning is not facilitated by pretence in the normal way.