We assume optimal specialization (in the nuclear family) involves one partn
er doing 'homework' and the other 'wagework. Basic human capital for one or
the other is Imparted to individuals through early childhood training. Mat
es are chosen on the basis of noneconomic criteria-'true love'. Because lov
e strikes randomly after basic human capital is acquired, a coordination pr
oblem arises in choosing complementary specializations. Even with no discri
mination, there exist equilibria characterized by gender roles - perfect co
rrelation between sex and family roles. There may also exist other equilibr
ia in which the correlation between sex and family roles is imperfect and i
ndividuals are trained by aptitude. We rank the equilibria when they coexis
t and demonstrate that affirmative action policies can increase average wel
fare by eliminating some equilibria. The analysis is conducted in a framewo
rk which characterizes individuals by training, by aptitude, and by family
role in a 2 x 2 x 2 model. In this framework, we formalize the equality of
the sexes as well as the relative importance of nature versus nurture and v
arious types of training. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserve
d. JEL classification: D1; J2.