Several conditions for being an intrinsically intentional agent are put for
ward. On a first level of intentionality the agent has representations. Two
kinds are described: cued and detached. An agent with both kinds is able t
o represent both what is prompted by the context and what is absent from it
. An intermediate level of intentionality is achieved by having an inner wo
rld, that is, a coherent system of detached representations that model the
world. The inner world is used, e.g., for conditional and counterfactual th
inking. Contextual or indexical representations are necessary in order that
the inner world relates to the actual external world and thus can be used
as a basis for action. To have full-blown intentionality, the agent should
also have a detached self-awareness, that is, be able to entertain self-rep
resentations that are independent of the context.