Representation and self-awareness in intentional agents

Citation
I. Brinck et P. Gardenfors, Representation and self-awareness in intentional agents, SYNTHESE, 118(1), 1999, pp. 89-104
Citations number
30
Categorie Soggetti
Philosiphy
Journal title
SYNTHESE
ISSN journal
00397857 → ACNP
Volume
118
Issue
1
Year of publication
1999
Pages
89 - 104
Database
ISI
SICI code
0039-7857(199901)118:1<89:RASIIA>2.0.ZU;2-W
Abstract
Several conditions for being an intrinsically intentional agent are put for ward. On a first level of intentionality the agent has representations. Two kinds are described: cued and detached. An agent with both kinds is able t o represent both what is prompted by the context and what is absent from it . An intermediate level of intentionality is achieved by having an inner wo rld, that is, a coherent system of detached representations that model the world. The inner world is used, e.g., for conditional and counterfactual th inking. Contextual or indexical representations are necessary in order that the inner world relates to the actual external world and thus can be used as a basis for action. To have full-blown intentionality, the agent should also have a detached self-awareness, that is, be able to entertain self-rep resentations that are independent of the context.