Evidence shows that firms build their market position by accumulating knowl
edge protected by secrecy, patents and other appropriation devices. I explo
re the implications of this fact in a model economy where oligopolistic fir
ms establish in-house R&D programs, In symmetric equilibrium, the number of
firms determines concentration and firm size, These determine the scale an
d the efficiency of R&D operations and the rate of innovation. The number o
f firms, moreover, is endogenous and determined jointly with the rate of gr
owth by the zero-profit condition. This property yields new results. For ex
ample, the scale effect of population size may be negative. The market allo
cation of resources is not Pareto optimal. I discuss the nature of this dis
tortion (C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classificat
ion. E10; L16; O31; O40.