Keeping a tight grip on the reins: donor control over aid coordination andmanagement in Bangladesh

A long-standing consensus that aid coordination should be owned by recipien t authorities has been eclipsed by accord on the desirability of recipient management of aid along-side domestic resources, Nonetheless, in many low a nd lower-middle income countries, donors remain remarkably uncoordinated; w here attempts at coordination are made, they are often donor-driven, and on ly a small proportion of aid is directly managed by recipients. This paper draws on evidence from an in-depth review of aid to the health s ector in Bangladesh to analyze the systems by which external resources are managed. Based on interviews with key stakeholders, a questionnaire survey and analysis of documentary sources, the factors constraining the governmen t from assuming a more active role in aid management are explored. The resu lts suggest that donor perceptions of weak government capacity, inadequate accountability and compromised integrity only partially account for the pro pensity for donor leadership. Equally important is the consideration that a id coordination has a markedly political dimension. Stakeholders are well a ware of the power, influence and leverage which aid coordination confers, a n awareness which colours the desire of some stakeholders to lead aid coord ination processes, and conditions the extent and manner by which others wis h to be involved. It is argued that recipient management of external aid is dependent on major changes in the attitudes and behaviours of recipients a nd donors alike.