HOW MAY WE EXPLORE THE THEORY OF MIND WIT H SCHIZOPHRENICS - PULSIONAL INTENTIONALITY AND DEVELOPMENT

The critique of a recent article by Frith and Corcoran allows us to ra ise the question of the paradigm of the theory of mind in the understa nding of autism and schizophrenia. This paradigm can also be found, ou tside of all modular theories of mind, amidst phenomenological psychia trists who describe ''disorders of common sense'' in schizophrenia. In clinical terms the exploration of the theory of mind in schizophrenic s cannot be limited to epistemic states. The discretion of schizophren ic syndromes, particularly the possible identification of a syndrome o f pure passivity, outside of all paranoid or incoherent elements, rais es the question of the axioms pertaining to the theories of mind, amon g these axioms obviously one must come to terms with those which suppo se an epistemic or cognitive relationship with emotional or carnal des ire, intentionality as directed towards worldly objects is not compara ble to that directed towards objects that have an intentional structur e, i.e, other persons. The authors attempt to link these questions to the prejudices of: (a) the mentalist conception of intentionality base d on a description of the physical world states; (b) the modular conce ption of mind based on the principle of identity; (c) a conception bas ed on representation. The authors insist both on identity and dualism that the husserlian notion of intentionality presupposes. The idea of movement of signification and the intimate living flux of consciousnes s (pulsional intentionality) render explicit is in effect essential to account for the progressive modification of mental states by themselv es, this only fan explicate clinical phenomena like hallucinations. Th is possibility of modification is finally linked to a narrative concep tion of mental phenomena thus raising the question of development.