G. Fontana et B. Gerrard, Disequilibrium states and adjustment processes: towards a historical-time analysis of behaviour under uncertainty, PHILOS PSYC, 12(3), 1999, pp. 311-324
Mainstream theories of decision making conceptualise uncertainty in terms o
f a well-defined probability distribution or weighting function. Following
Knight, radical Keynesians consider subjective expected utility (SEU) theor
y and its variants as a restricted theory of decisionmaking applicable to s
ituations of risk and, hence, of limited relevance to the understanding of
crucial economic decisions under conditions of fundamental uncertainty in w
hich probabilities are ill-defined, possibly non-existent.
The objective of this paper is to outline a radical Keynesian theory of dec
ision-making under uncertainty, arguing that Keynes's suggestion to a two-d
imensional probability-credence framework provides the basis for determinin
g the limitations of mainstream approaches and points the way forward to th
e construction of a more general encompassing theory relevant to psychologi
sts and economists outside of the Keynesian tradition.