Cavity decoupling in salt is the most plausible means by which a nation cou
ld conduct clandestine testing of militarily significant nuclear weapons. T
he conditions under which solution-mined salt can be used for this purpose
are quite restrictive, The salt must be thick and reasonably pure, Containm
ent of explosions sets a shallow limit on depth, and cavity stability sets
a deep limit. These constraints are met in considerably <1% of the total la
nd area of India and Pakistan, Most of that area is too dry for cavity cons
truction by solution mining; disposal of brine in rivers can be detected ea
sily. Salt domes, the most favorable structures for constructing large cavi
ties, are not present in India and Pakistan. Confidence that they are adher
ing to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is enhanced by their geolog
ical conditions, which are quite favorable to verification, not evasion. Th
us, their participation in the CTBT is constrained overwhelmingly by politi
cal, not scientific, issues. Confidence in the verification of the CTBT cou
ld be enhanced if India and Pakistan permitted stations of the various moni
toring technologies that are now widely deployed elsewhere to be operated o
n their territories.