Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies: A note

Authors
Deb, R Ohseto, S
Citation
R. Deb et S. Ohseto, Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies: A note, ECON THEORY, 14(3), 1999, pp. 685-689
Citations number
3
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN journal
09382259 → ACNP
Volume
14
Issue
3
Year of publication
1999
Pages
685 - 689
Database
ISI
SICI code
0938-2259(199911)14:3<685:SAIRSC>2.0.ZU;2-F
Abstract
Serizawa [3] characterized the set of strategy-proof, individually rational , no exploitative, and non-bossy social choice functions in economies with pure public goods. He left an open question whether non-bossiness is necess ary for his characterization. We will prove that nan-bossiness is implied b y the other three axioms in his characterization.