This article examines how senior permanent officials in the European Commis
sion (director-generals and directors) conceive of the role of nationality
in their organization. Do they support a weberian ideal-typical bureaucrati
c organization, where merit shapes personnel selection and task organizatio
n, or do they prefer a consociational form, in which nationalities are repr
esented in organization and policymaking? I explain variation in weberian a
nd consociational orientations, using 105 mail questionnaires collected bet
ween July 1995 and May 1997. In explaining variation, I contrast socializat
ion factors and factors related to the professional utility function of off
icials. I find that utility packs far more power than socialization. Suppor
t for consociational principles is highest among officials who belong to na
tionalities that are organized in strong multifunctional networks in Brusse
ls. In an administration where nationality is a po powerful principle of pe
rsonnel organization, officials with the "right citizenship" have compellin
g incentives to reinforce its role. Professional utility is also a function
of one's position in the work environment: officials in positions of weak
regulatory autonomy or dealing with quality of life issues are move likely
to be consociational. Socialization is weak, though prior experience as a n
ational civil servant reduces consociationalism and prior Commission cabine
t experience increases it.