Interests, institutions, and ideology in securing policy change: The republican conversion to trade liberalization after Smoot-Hawley

This paper investigates how changes in both institutional incentives and ec onomic interests are important for securing durable changes in economic pol icy. We study how bipartisan support developed to sustain the Reciprocal Tr ade Agreements Act (RTAA) of 1934, which fundamentally transformed U.S, tra de policy. The durability of this change was achieved only when the Republi cans, long-time supporters of high tariffs who originally vowed to repeal t he RTAA, began to support this Democratic initiative in the 1940s. We find little evidence of an ideological shift among Republicans, but rather an in creased sensitivity to export interests for which the institutional structu re of the RTAA itself may have been responsible. We conclude that the combi nation of greater export opportunities and the institutional change that st rengthened exporters' lobbying position was required to bring about Republi can support for trade liberalization.