Can courts confer citizenship? Plenary power and equal protection

Authors
Citation
D. Ludwin, Can courts confer citizenship? Plenary power and equal protection, NY U LAW RE, 74(5), 1999, pp. 1376-1406
Citations number
48
Categorie Soggetti
Law
Journal title
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ISSN journal
00287881 → ACNP
Volume
74
Issue
5
Year of publication
1999
Pages
1376 - 1406
Database
ISI
SICI code
0028-7881(199911)74:5<1376:CCCCPP>2.0.ZU;2-P
Abstract
In this Note, Derek Ludwin applies principles of equity to the jurisprudenc e of nationalization law. In a recent case, Miller v. Albright, the Supreme Court failed to provide a remedy for the victim of an unconstitutional nat uralization statute that favors foreign-born illegitimate children of citiz en mothers over those born to citizen fathers. Ludwin highlights the Court' s unnecessary impotence due to its strict adherence to the plenary power do ctrine and unquestioning deference to Congress. He traces the history of th e application of the plenary power doctrine in naturalization law, noting t hat the Court has never overturned a naturalization statute on equal protec tion grounds. Ludwin finds, however, that Miller, in which a majority of th e justices deemed a naturalization statute to be unconstitutional, marks an important jurisprudential shift toward applying the plenary power doctrine in conjunction with other interests, such as equal protection Ludwin furth er argues that the Miller Court's unwillingness to address the tension betw een plenary power and equal protection has left the lower courts without gu idance in this area and that without an effective remedy-the power to grant citizenship directly-the Court's finding of unconstitutionality is too wea k to afford any real protection. The answer, Ire states, lies in principles of modern equity. Ludwin concludes that direct conferral of citizenship is in accordance with the Court's generous post-Brown exercise of equity powe r in equal protection cases.