State trading emerged as one of the more contentious issues at the end of t
he Uruguay Round of negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, and U.S. officials have said that state-trading is an important iss
ue for further negotiation in the mini-round on agriculture scheduled to be
gin in 1999. The prevalence of state trading by wheat-importing countries i
s examined, and reasons for reform are explored. This paper investigates tw
o hypotheses:
whether operation of a stare trading enterprise is associated with a higher
level of protection than with private traders and
whether decisions made by state traders regarding the source of wheat is ma
de on a noncommercial basis.
The effective level of protection, net import demand equations and a simple
Armington model for U.S. and Canadian wheat exports are estimated to inves
tigate these hypotheses. Behavior is compared across countries who differ i
n their institutional arrangements for importing wheat. It is also compared
over time within countries who have reformed their state trading enterpris
e to assess whether reform leads to different market behavior.