No chance for incentive-oriented environmental policies in representative democracies? A Public Choice analysis

Using the Public Choice approach, this paper gives an explanation as to why in representative democracies, in which political entrepreneurs attempt to maximize utility, an incentive-oriented environmental policy has hardly an y chance of being implemented. We discuss two main aspects: first, the reas ons which make it difficult to enforce any kind of environmental policy in the competitive political environment. And second, why such a policy-if it can be implemented at all-is very often enacted with inefficient instrument s. In order to give a satisfactory explanation of these 'execution deficits ', we differentiate between voters', politicians', interest groups', and bu reaucracies' behavior to show that there are conflicts with other policies, and that individual rationality may be the greatest obstacle in implementi ng most incentive-oriented environmental policies. In the final section we provide five suggestions for overcoming these difficulties. (C) 1999 Elsevi er Science B.V. All rights reserved.