This paper studies the effects of generic drugs in the pharmaceutical indus
try. Two firms produce two branded goods, with a different active ingredien
t, and the patent for one of them has expired, so that a generic alternativ
e is in the market. This paper focuses on the case where the branded goods
are perfect substitutes and where there exists a degree of differentiation
between the branded and the generic goods. The study looks at whether the f
irm producing the branded good whose patent has expired has incentives to p
roduce its own generic alternative too. For this purpose, the scenario wher
e the firm producing the branded good also produces the generic drug is com
pared with the situation where the generic good is produced by a third firm
. It is found that the firm producing the branded good has incentives to pr
oduce its generic alternative, owing to a market segmentation effect. This
induces an increase in the price of the branded good produced by this firm,
which in turn implies a welfare reduction. (C) 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd
.