Foreign direct investment (FDI) is observed to be a predominant form of cap
ital flows to emerging economies, especially when they are liquidity-constr
ained internationally during a global financial crisis. The financial aspec
ts of FDI are the focus of this paper. We analyze the problem of channellin
g domestic savings into productive investment in the presence of asymmetric
information between the managing owners of firms and other portfolio stake
holders. We explore the role played by FDI in reviving equity-financed capi
tal investment for economies plagued by such information problems. In the p
resence of information asymmetry, the paper identifies, however, how FDI gi
ves rise to foreign overinvestment as well as domestic undersaving. The gai
ns from trade argument (applied to intertemporal trade) is re-examined in t
his case of informational-asymmetry-driven FDI. We show that the gains coul
d be sizable when the domestic credit market is either under-developed or f
ailing as a result of a financial crisis. But with a well-functioning domes
tic credit market, the gains turn into losses. Surprisingly, capital may fl
ow into the country even when the autarkic marginal productivity of capital
in the domestic economy falls short of the world rate of interest. In such
a situation, capital should have efficiently flown out rather than in, and
FDI is a social loss-generating phenomenon.