The design of fishing-right systems - the NSW experience

In 1994, the Australian state of New South Wales (NSW) passed legislation t o introduce a fishery share system. In some ways it is similar to the 'ITQ' , or individual transferable quota, fishery management systems found in New Zealand, Iceland, Australia, Canada and other countries. The focus of the system, however, is on fisheries rather than species. In most of these fish eries, a combination of input and output controls are used. Special design features include allotment of shares in the 'fishery' rather than in quotas , and a structure that forces adaptive resource management. The system is d esigned to maximise the probability that fishery use will remain both susta inable and consistent with social objectives as they change through time. T he system's conceptual framework is of relevance to other fisheries and, al so, many other industries that use natural resources. Consistent with periodically revised management plans, rights to harvest sp ecific amounts of fish or to use certain classes of boars and gear are issu ed in proportion to the number of shapes held in each fishery, "fishery" be ing flexibly defined by region and habitat, with or without further specifi cation by gear-type, species group or single species. The management plan m ight, for example, specify a relationship between number of shares and size of boat or net. Any quotas are allocated in proportion to the number of sh ares held. Subject to compliance with periodically reviewed share condition s, rights are perpetual and give each fisher a direct financial interest in the future of the fishery. Shares are mortgageable and fully transferable. Driven by the management plan, structural adjustment is delegated to the m arket and individual fishers. A dual property-right structure is used to mi nimise transfer costs encourage self-enforcement and compliance. (C) 1999 E lsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.